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Les trois défis de l’industrie automobile européenne 
Résumé 
L’industrie  automobile  européenne  est  une  fois  de  plus  entrée  dans  une  période  de 
perturbations. La crise des années 2008/2009, loin d’être achevée, marque probablement 
l’entrée dans une nouvelle ère, ce que certains appellent la Seconde révolution automobile. 
Dans cet article, nous souhaitons mettre l’accent sur trois grandes incertitudes qui pèsent sur 
l’industrie européenne. La première concerne le produit qu’elle sera amenée à produire et 
vendre. Les interrogations sur le véhicule électrique mais également la question des véhicules 
thermique que l’on peut espérer vendre à des consommateurs européens atones occuperont 
la  première  section.  Dans  une  seconde  question,  nous  reviendrons  sur  les  stratégies 
d’externalisation qui se sont développées depuis les trente dernières années et les limites qui 
semblent  se  dessiner.  La  dernière  section  concernera  la  profonde  recomposition 
géographique qui s’opère sous nos yeux depuis une dizaine d’année et qui pose directement 
la question du devenir des capacités productives dans la vieille Europe. 
Mots-clés : Industrie automobile, véhicule électrique, architecture industrielle, géographie 
industrielle, équipementiers 
 
Three uncertainties looming over the European auto industry 
 
Abstract 
The European automotive industry has once again entered a period of uproar. The crisis of 
2008/2009 is far from over but probably marks the start of a new era that some observers 
are starting to refer to as the second automobile revolution. In this article, we will be trying 
to emphasize three major uncertainties that weigh upon the European automotive industry. 
The first relates to the future products that the sector is looking to manufacture and sell. This 
will involve questions about electric vehicles but also how internal combustion vehicles might 
be  sold  to  more  tone-deaf  European  consumers.  The  second  section  will  revisit  the 
outsourcing  strategies  that  have  arisen  over  the  past  30  years,  together  with  their 
increasingly  obvious  limitations.  The  final  section  will  highlight  the  profound  geographic 
recomposition that has taken place under our eyes over the past decade or so, and which 
speaks directly to the issue of Old Europe’s productive capacities in the future.  
 
Keywords:  Automobile  industry,  electric  vehicles,  industrial  architecture,  carmakers, 
industrial geography, first tier suppliers 
JEL: L62; L23; L24; O33; M21 
Reference to this paper: FRIGANT Vincent (2011) Three uncertainties looming over the European 
auto industry, Cahiers du GREThA, n°2011-34. 
 http://ideas.repec.org/p/grt/wpegrt/2011-34.html 







The automobile is a relatively singular kind of economic product. Even without speaking to its 
social and cultural dimensions, cars are undoubtedly the most expensive consumer item in many 
households. In a country like France, around 10% of households’ total real consumption is allocated 
to this item, including acquisition (new or used) and usage (fuel, maintenance, insurance, etc.). Such 
spending sustains a wide array of economic actors in what the GERPISA
2 Research Center suggests 
referring to as the European automotive system (Lung, 2004).  
A  significant  proportion  of  value  creation  and  jobs  in  this  system,  involve  the  industrial 
activities associated with vehicle manufacturing. According to Eurostat data, the automotive sector in 
the narrow sense of the term (Nace dm341-343) directly employs 2.3 million people in the EU27. 
Adding to this - as the European Automobile Manufacturers Association does - 1.2 million jobs in 
sectors with close ties to the automobile, the total amounts to 10% of all manufacturing jobs in 
Europe27. 
When apprehended on the scale, the European automotive industry is still a major economic 
activity. As the sector embodying the Postwar boom years, it remains an important sector in many 
Old  European  countries  while  also  driving  development  in  many  of  the  Continent’s  economic 
newcomers,  including  the  Czech  Republic,  Poland,  Slovakia  and,  to  a  lesser  degree,  Romania 
(Pavlinek, Domanski, Guzik, 2009).  
Even as the automotive industry continues to play a major role in the European economy, it is 
undergoing a number of profound changes. Of course, saying that the business is currently subject to 
intense mutation is both accurate and trivial as a statement. Since the automotive industry first 
emerged, it has never stopped restructuring or mutating due to the effects of three endogenous 
drivers. 
·  Search for lower costs. The importance in this industry of fixed costs and production scale 
mean that actors must constantly try to improve the efficiency of their production processes, 
explaining  the  sector’s  early  incorporation  of  automation,  automatisation,  robotisation 
(depending on the term in use at a particular time) without forgetting the importance of 
other  aspects  such  as  the  wage-labor  nexus,  the  proclivity  for  organisational  innovation 
(assembly line work, kanban, just-in-time, synchronous flows, workshop support teams, etc.). 
·  Market expansion. As an industry with intrinsic links to mass consumption, one key concern 
here is access to consumers. This explains the sector’s singular way of selling products; the 
importance of product characteristics; its intensive communications work; the creation of 
product- and brand-related images; and the endemic need to expand market space (thus the 
insatiable drive to internationalise). 
                                                      
1 This paper is a first draft-introduction to a special issue of European Review of Industrial Economics and Policy dedicated to the future of 
the European automobile industry which will be published in December 2011. The final version of this paper and the quoted papers 
could/can be downloaded freely at http://revel.unice.fr/eriep/. 
2  Founded  in  the  early  1980s,  GERPISA  is  an  international  network  of  automobile  researchers  that  has  the  particularly  of  being 
multidisciplinary in nature and working to four-year study programme. The texts comprising this special ERIEP issue were written by 
occasional or regular network participants. Some were introduced at Gerpisa’s annual conference held in June 2011 in Paris. For more 
information: http://gerpisa.org/  Three uncertainties looming over the European auto industry 
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·  Technological  innovation.  As  a  complex  technological  product,  the  automobile  has 
experienced a constant evolution in its technical characteristics, whether by improving  basic 
technologies, adding new fields of technology (e.g. electronics) or developing new design 
methods often leading to structural modifications that can have a knock-on effect on the 
areas mentioned above - as illustrated by rising modularisation. 
These  three  drivers  (which  can  combine  with  one  another)  explain  why  the  automotive 
industry - in the broadest sense of the term, ranging from carmakers to equipment suppliers and 
including subcontractors - is always restructuring. At the same time, it can be argued that the sector 
faces even greater uncertainty today than ever before – to the extent that some analysts interpret 
the present era as the second automobile revolution (Freyssenet, 2009). For this reason, this article 
will highlight the three great uncertainties weighing on the European automotive industry. 
The first uncertainty relates to the product itself, such as it is going to be manufactured and 
sold in the future. The first section will therefore question product ranges and more broadly the 
internal combustion vehicle that has dominated this sector since the early 20
th century. The second 
section will revisit the outsourcing strategies that actors have pursued over the past 30 years and 
highlight their increasingly obvious limitations. The final section will analyse the profound geographic 
recomposition that has unfolded before our eyes over the past decade, questioning directly the Old 
Europe’s future productive capabilities. 
1. What might tomorrow’s automobile look like? 
The first set of uncertainties relates to the products that consumers will use, over the more or 
less long term, for their mobility needs. Equipped with a growing number of active and passive 
functions,  internal  combustion  automobiles  have  dominated  for  a  century  to  become  a  key 
instrument of mobility. It is not at all certain, however, that this will remain the case in the future. 
Two  constraints  seem  to  have  interrupted  this  race  towards  greater  sophistication:  ecological 
constraints  requiring  lighter  vehicles  and  radically  different  driving  systems;  and  the  increasing 
difficulty in getting a growing proportion of the population to buy new cars.  
1.1 The move towards carbon-free vehicles 
The automotive industry currently faces serious questions in terms of its future product sales. 
These challenges have given birth to a large corpus that is of great interest to academics, politicians 
and other “experts” in this field (consultants, NGOs, etc).
3 It is impossible in a brief exposé to cover 
this entire topic. Instead, what we can try to show is the strategic uncertainty that weighs upon 
carmakers, and how states intervene at this level. 
A  radical  way  of  broaching  this  question  consists  of  asking  whether  internal  combustion 
vehicles  have  any  future at  all.  Environmental  constraints  (opposing  CO2  emissions  in  a  context 
defined by global warming) and resource concerns (oil shortages increasing energy costs in the short 
run before quasi-depletion in the not-so-distant future) legitimise this question being asked in very 
stark terms. Of course, sceptics have been quick to respond that this is not the first time that the end 
of oil and the advent of other fuel sources have been mooted. Some also say that big reductions 
remain  possible  in  internal  combustion  vehicles’  consumption  levels.  Figure  1  is  often  used  to 
illustrate the eternal return of electric vehicles. 
                                                      
3 A Google search of the term “electric car” comes up with 19.5 million pages – with Google Scholar counting 19,400 links on 8 July 2011, 
including 4,980 new ones since 2007.  Three uncertainties looming over the European auto industry 
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Figure 1 – Market share for electric vehicles (% of new vehicle sales in France and the USA) 
 
Sources: CAS, 2011; Fréry, 2000 
Sceptics’ arguments are mainly built around the current state of technology. This is because 
technological obstacles relating to batteries have yet to be resolved (product cost, vehicle autonomy 
and functionality, controversy about battery safety, etc.) - not to mention a number of other, more 
geo-political  risks  including  the  depletion  of  lithium  reserves  and  rare  earth  shortages  or 
monopolistic  practices.  In  addition,  certain  environmental  objectives  that  are  crucial  to  the 
arguments used by electric vehicle advocates do require greater scrutiny. These include whether the 
electricity consumed thusly will be carbon-free and how electric vehicles are to be recycled. On top 
of this, there are still major uncertainties about future oil prices and reserves. 
Yet  past  failures  do  not  necessarily  have  to  be  repeated.  For  instance,  Michel  Freyssenet 
(2011.b) estimates that the current context is generally favourable to electric vehicles, with the 
development of this product depending on a coherent management of four elements: the current 
transportation system crisis; technological stumbling blocks largely caused by the actions of non-
automotive  agents;  the  emergence  of  coalitions  of  actors  who  may  be  heterogeneous  but  are 
nevertheless converging towards one and the same objective; and the link between macro-economic 
pressure and public intervention. Of course, Freyssenet recognises that achieving coherency between 
the four elements is a complex undertaking. His sense is that the first two are already being attended 
to. As for the latter two, they are still up in the air but he detects a number of credible indications 
that they might be resolved one day. De facto, what we seem to be facing is a clear path towards a 
second automobile revolution. 
Notwithstanding  the  solidity  of  Freyssenet’s  argument,  all  automakers  have not  the  same 
anticipation. There are divergences among them about: 1) the magnitude of current changes; 2) the 
decisions required. In this view, committing to electric vehicles will require significant investments in 
a market characterised by uncertain commercial prospects
4. Carmakers therefore find themselves in 
a position of radical uncertainty. Between past failures, technological uncertainty and ecological 
uncertainty, the move to carbon-free vehicles raises a number of unresolved issues that are difficult 
for industry actors lacking a clear vision of the future. The industrial dynamics at work here are 
fascinating since they enable a living study of how companies try to develop reasoned discourses and 
rational  practices  in  an  uncertain  universe.  Two  issues  are  particularly  interesting  at  this  level: 
                                                      
4 Just to mention a few evaluations, Daimler has estimated that 100% electric vehicles should account for around 5% of the market by 2020 
whereas Renault expects 10% and BMW 5 to 15%. Consultants also diverge, with JD Power expecting 1.3 million electric vehicles to be sold 
by 2020 (including 742,000 in Europe) or 1.8% of the global market (7.3% if hybrid vehicles are added). Roland Berger has estimated that 
20% of the vehicles sold in Europe will be 100% electric or hybrid by 2020, amounting to between 8 and 10 million units. Oliver Wyman has 
predicted that electric vehicles will account for 3.2%  of the global market by 2025. Lastly, XERFI predicted in its December 2010 study that 
electric vehicles will be equal to 2% of all automobile sales by 2020. 
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companies’ strategic positioning; and their search for an economic model that might facilitate the 
sale of electric vehicles. 
1.1.1. Radical uncertainty about strategic choices 
The first uncertainty refers to the way in which carmakers interpret available data to construct 
their strategic positioning. It is noteworthy that starting with identical data, the main actors in this 
market have come up with different interpretations and positioned themselves in sometimes highly 
divergent ways. This always creates the impression that carmakers have decided to offer us a real 
live application of Simon’s bounded rationality hypothesis. In a recent study (see Table 1), Freyssenet 
(2011.a) analysed the strategic priorities being implemented by the world’s leading carmakers.  
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Indian carmakers 
Nearly  all  start-
ups & others 
Source: Freyssenet, 2011.a 
Freyssenet’s roadmap is unstable (compare Freyssenet 2011.a & 2011.b) since companies are 
fully aware that they find themselves in a technological emergence phase characterised by a wide 
range  of  possibilities.  Still,  given  the  heavy  fixed  costs  associated  with  this  industry  and  the 
importance of learning effects here, any bad choices could turn out to be extremely detrimental 
(even if one technology or class of technologies were to dominate in the near future). This being the 
case,  some  carmakers  will  try  to  delay  their  decisions  for  as  long  as  possible,  hoping  that  new 
information will arise enabling them to adopt what will become “the” winning technology. At the 
same time, given the aforementioned learning effects, it is not all certain that postponing decisions 
creates  a  winning  strategy  –  that  is,  unless  companies  have  the  financial  resources  to  invest 
massively whenever market conditions improve (the strategy pursued by Volkswagen and especially 
Toyota, with its unrivaled control of hybrid technologies). One intermediary way for companies to 
position themselves without making any massive commitments is to agree alliances. Indeed, recent 
months have seen a growing number of agreements of this sort amongst carmakers seeking to share 
technology. 
Carbon-free  vehicles  also  offer  a  lesson  in  economic  theory,  pertaining  specifically  to  the 
different  strategies  that  market  newcomers  and/or  outsiders  can  pursue.  Freyssenet  (2011.b) 
emphasizes at this level that dozens of actors have already tried to push electric vehicles in the past 
(“traditional cars”, bicycles, sports cars, low speed cars, etc.). Asides from the pioneering phase when 
the automobile was first born, the market has probably never seen so many potential entrants! 
Moreover, such actors do not necessarily originate in the automotive sector or come from countries 
characterised by established manufacturers. 
Domanski,  Guzik  and  Gwosdz  (2011)  detail  the  recent  rapid  rise  of  Solaris  buses’  Polish 
manufacturer, notably with its strategy of electrifying its entire product range. This is an interesting 
analysis  for  at  least  two  reasons.  Firstly,  it  lends  credibility  to  certain  disruptive  scenarios 
hypothesizing that if today’s actors do not invest this field, they run a risk of being outflanked by 
newcomers. Secondly, it questions the customary image of Eastern Europe, one focused on the idea Three uncertainties looming over the European auto industry 
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that the automotive industry’s development is driven by FDI from carmakers coming out of the 
developed world. It is clear that a certain economic and geographic recomposition will be required to 
develop  electric  vehicles  to  any  great  extent.  Even  if  bus  manufacturing  is  technologically  less 
complex than making a passenger car, we can learn a much from this case study of Solaris.  
Renault-Nissan would appear to be the group that is responding most proactively to this latent 
recomposition of the market. According to P. Pélata (2010, p.39), Renault’s CEO until 2011, “In this 
ever-changing  global  marketplace,  the  winners  will  be  those  who  develop  an  efficient  electric 
vehicle”. Given the magnitude of the investment required, the cost is bound to be major, making this 
a  real  challenge.  Renault’s  positioning  is  based  on  three  interpretations.  Firstly,  facing  up  to 
environmental and resource constraints will inevitably induce the market to seek an alternative to 
the internal combustion engine. Secondly, states will have to get involved to nurture electric vehicles’ 
emergence, thereby fulfilling their public commitments while responding to public demand. This 
means that they will have to commit public resources to support electric vehicle sales by ensuring 
that  it  is  profitable  to  buy  such  products.  These  incentives  might  also  be  strengthened  by  an 
announcement that products in this area (such as vehicle batteries) are being built in those countries 
that support electric vehicle purchases.
5 Lastly, it is worth noting that the product’s past failures 
were  caused,  at  least  partially,  by  the  market’s  slow  take-off.  A  critical  level  of  sales  and 
infrastructure must be achieved rapidly to generate positive feedback effects (existence of a market 
for used vehicles; battery distribution networks; vehicle maintenance networks, positive reputation 
effects coming from first-user prescriptions, etc.). In sum, electric vehicles’ success is predicated on a 
rapid take-off of a market in which Renault hopes to capitalise (image and learning effects). 
Renault’s strategy therefore explicitly incorporates the state as an actor. Indeed, since the 
2008/2009 crisis, industrial policy has become a main automotive driver (Jullien, Lung, 2011). The 
return of the state has become particularly necessary given the plethora of technological (open 
alternative) and economic uncertainties being faced. In addition to the aforementioned purchasing 
cost reduction incentives, Renault has also had to consider: 1) research and development costs; 2) 
issues surrounding the construction of supportive infrastructure (e.g. charging points); and 3) public 
policy, including town planning issues and transportation network correspondence (Jullien, Lung, 
2011). These problems either have a direct effect on the public domain or are too important to be 
resolved by the private sector alone, and therefore imply state intervention. 
At the same time and as J. Hildemeir and A. Villareal note, European states’ industrial policies 
have tended to pursue a variety of trajectories. One reason for this diversity is the way in which 
policy is constructed (Smith, Jullien 2008). Discourses legitimising public action (along with the more 
practical mechanisms  associated  with their  implementation)  tend to  be  rooted  in  an  interactive 
process  where  many  actors  with  sometimes  convergent  but  also  contradictory  interests  will 
intervene.  The  ensuing  industrial  policy  can  culminate  in  unstable  compromises  translating  the 
balance  of  power  at  a  particular  moment  in  time  and  actors’  ability  to  publicise  the  kinds  of 
arguments  that  the  political  sphere  relies  upon  to  legitimise  its  decisions  (Jullien,  Smith,  2011). 
Within this framework, it becomes easier to understand the clear divergences between the French 
and German governments in terms of their respective commitments to developing electric vehicles. 
Renault’s  audacious  choice  argues  for  strong  intervention  by  the  French  state,  even  if  PSA’s 
alternative  positioning  partially  undermines  this  message.  Conversely,  German  carmakers’ 
positioning, which dominates internal combustion vehicles, incentivise their government to go down 
another path and stay out of this area  - with one solution being to skip the electric phase altogether 
and go straight into hydrogen cars (Hildemeir, Villareal, 2011). 
                                                      
5 Renault’s four electric vehicle production sites are Flins for the Zoé, Maubeuge for the Kangoo Express, Valladolid for the Twizzy and 
Turkey for the Fluence. Three uncertainties looming over the European auto industry 
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This hesitant attitude in Europe, due in part to the Continent’s divergent industrial interests, 
contrasts with Asia’s more statist stances. For instance, Hyundai’s initial idea was to position itself in 
hybrid vehicles and eschew electric solutions. But as we have seen in the table 1, due to pressure 
from the South Korean government, Hyundai recently changed its priority – a choice that illustrates 
the two mechanisms underlying this whole issue. Firstly, state institutions do not necessarily have 
the same way of reading the data revealed through techno-economic debates about the future of 
the automobile. As such, they will construct their own vision of tomorrow’s market. Secondly, they 
do not tend to weight data in the same way as carmakers do - with, for instance, CO2 emissions 
reductions ensuring compliance with international agreements featuring highly on their list of explicit 
preferences. In other words, the data associated with this problem is based neither on an identical 
preference functions nor on identical information. In Simonian terms, the process of compiling and 
processing relevant but different information creates a situation where there is every chance that 
decisions will differ from the ones that the carmakers would have made
6.  
Similarly, long-term industrial strategy criteria can also have an effect. One example is the 
Chinese government’s keen awareness of the strategic competitive advantage it enjoys due to the 
country’s rare earth reserves. In a recent paper, Wang and Kimble (2010) showed that in the not-so-
distant future, Chinese automakers will be able to start behaving like major actors in the electric 
vehicle market, given their strength in the key competencies associated with these technologies and 
the strong government support that they enjoy. G. Balcet and J. Ruet (2011) analyse this in similar 
terms,  emphasizing  Chinese  carmakers’s  proactivity  (particularly  BYD)  towards  electric  vehicles, 
because the Beijing regime views this field as strategic and wants domestic carmakers to skip a 
generation and take a dominant position in tomorrow’s carbon-free vehicles.  
1.1.2. Towards the invention of new sales model? 
A second key issue today is how products are to be sold in the future. Although this point is 
broader  than  electric  vehicles  alone,  such  items  do  offer  a  good  case  in  point  with  current 
cost/benefit calculations indicating that they only benefit consumers within a relatively narrow range 
of technological parameters (driving distance, recharging times, etc.) and economic factors (energy 
costs, resale values, etc.) (CAS, 2011). 
Within this context and asides from monetary purchase incentives, there are questions about 
how consumers might access electric products. One of the originalities of Renault’s strategy is to 
separate  the  purchase  of  the  vehicle  itself  from  its  batteries  (Pélata,  2010).  The  intent  of  this 
business model is to achieve a partial break with the traditional way that consumers access a good, 
which is to own it. At the same time, many studies indicate that it is possible to go further down this 
road and replace the ownership model with sharing or renting formats. The present text will not 
delve further into this debate but it is worth noting two interesting economic questions it raises. 
·  Who will sell the new offers of mobility? The ownership model had been developed by 
carmakers,  who  are  key  actors  in  the  sales  process  (via  dealers  that  they  can  integrate 
vertically into their value chains or control by contracts). The willingness to abandon the 
ownership  model  enables  the  arrival  of  newcomers  assuming  the  function  of  “mobility 
salespersons”. In the future, leading network companies (telecommunications, construction, 
energy, rentals) will be developing their own strategies to assume this role.  
                                                      
6 Note nevertheless emission reduction regulations have made a major contribution to carmakers’ strategic choices in the sense that 
manufacturing electrical/hybrid vehicles is one way of cutting a brand’s average emissions – this being the criterion underlying most 
European legislation. Three uncertainties looming over the European auto industry 
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·  What  will  consumers’  attitude  be?  Many  optimistic  interpretations  about  the  future  of 
electric  cars  are  based  on  expected  latent  demand  from  consumers/actors  willing  to 
abandon  ownership  modes  and  become  pure  users  of  a  multimodal  mobility  offer. 
Regardless of their merits, such expectations may seem opportunistic since they are largely 
rooted in optimistic ad hoc arguments lacking scientific evidence. Having said that, there is a 
possibility  here  that  supply  will  create  its  own  demand,  if  the  actors  providing  electric 
solutions offer sufficiently attractive product characteristics (profitability, green discourse, 
user-friendliness, etc.) What remains to be seen is the purchasing power that households will 
be able to allocate to automobiles in the future. 
1.2. How to sell new cars? 
One problem that European industry faces is renewing demand for new cars. B. Jullien and T. 
Pardi (2011) offer in-depth analysis of myths that have arisen around the idea of demand-driven 
production. At a deeper level, the authors hypothesize that carmakers’ strategic convergence has 
ultimately “killed off” demand. Based on a detailed statistical analysis of household spending surveys, 
Jullien and Pardi show that the target clientele for new car sales has fallen considerably over time. 
One crucial characteristic of the automobile market is the existence of a (competitive) market for 
used cars offering consumers at least one alternative to new purchases. The point here is to twin 
macro-economic factors (increased inequality) with more micro-economic ones (higher car prices 
calculated in average monthly salary terms to reflect vehicles’ greater sophistication). This means 
that almost inevitably there will be fewer new car purchases and more focus on other mobility-
related items, such as utilisation-related spending (fuel, maintenance, etc.) and used car purchasing 
costs. 
Figure 2 – Breakdown of annual registrations by product range, Europe17 and France (%) 
Figure 2a – Europe17 countries         Figure 2b - France 
 
Note: The range distribution was modified in 2006 because the “Others” category had disappeared. 
Source: CCFA, author 
According to Jullien and Pardi’s analysis, European carmakers should commit to a real strategic 
break with the past. One material indication of this need for rupture (asides from the data supplied 
by the two authors) can be perceived in the market’s downclassing tendencies. Figure 2 illustrates 
the displacement of purchasing towards vehicles positioned as market entry products. The “low” and 
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10
models having increased by eight points over the previous two years. This latter figure could be 
analysed as a direct consequence of the crisis but the overall trend still involves a European market 
repositioning itself towards the bottom of the range. Even Northern Europe consumers - customarily 
more oriented towards top-of-the-range models - have been increasingly attracted in recent years to 
smaller and/or less expensive brands such as Dacia (whose Sandero had a 2009 market share of 0.9% 
in Europe and 0.5% for Logan
7). In Germany, for instance, low range vehicles accounted for 27% of all 
new registrations in 2007 but 38% in 2009. This increase more or less took place to the detriment of 
higher range models, which fell from 20% to 13% over the same period. Alongside this, Southern 
European markets, illustrated in Figure 2 by France’s example, have also continued to descend the 
product range.  
In the short run, this market recomposition will cause European carmakers problems. The first 
relates to profit margins, given the greater competition and lower mark-ups on entry range models. 
The second involves the longevity of production sites in Old Europe, due to the fact that low-range 
vehicles are more affected by production costs. A significant proportion of entry range models are 
being produced today in low-cost countries - a phenomenon that also partially explains rising output 
in Eastern Europe (see below) and is exemplified by the Renault Twingo in Slovenia; Toyota Aygo, 
Citroën C1 and Peugeot 107 in Slovakia; Fiat 500, Fiat Panda and Ford Ka in Poland - not to mention 
the VW Fox in Brazil or Suzuki Swift and WagonR and Hyundai i10 in India. Beyond that, there is a 
discussion to be had on tomorrow’s ultra-low-cost vehicles such as the Tata Nano - a market where 
India intends to develop a strong position (Balcet, Ruet, 2011).  
According to B. Jullien and Y. Lung (2011), over the longer run this market recomposition will 
be problematic for carmakers because their market relationship is constructed first and foremost on 
the search for trickle down effects. Most carmakers want to be present in the Premium segment, 
believing  that  it  is  here  that  they  can  make  profits;  benefit  from  the  introduction  of  new 
technologies;  and  bolster their  brand  image.  But  we  can  question  this  strategic  convergence  of 
carmakers – at least in Europe, given German brands’ obvious domination here. Jullien and Lung 
explain that carmakers are de facto putting themselves in a position where they will be dominated by 
Volkswagen – incapable as they are of pursuing a differentiation strategy other than the “market 
architecture”  (Fligstein,  2001)  that  the  German  group  has  forced  upon  them.  This  inability  to 
conceptualise a truly alternative strategy - despite their ongoing decline - is particularly surprising 
given that Fiat, Renault and PSA possess a number of strengths that they could mobilise via models 
positioned a bit further downrange (cf. Figure 3). 
As for Renault, its Entry range vehicles (the Logan, Duster and Sanderro) are also capable of 
capturing market share. After some initial hesitation, Renault’s Dacia brand models - which only 
targeted emerging markets at first - are now being distributed throughout Western Europe, with a 
success that has been something of a surprise to the group executive. These commercial results have 
revealed to carmakers the existence of potentially unsatisfied demand from households who have 
been excluded from the new car market and are now turning to the used car market because they 
find no other product corresponding to their needs. Renault may be trying to capitalise on this 
success by launching new models and increasing production capacities with a new plant in Tangiers 
(Morocco),  but  there  has  been  surprisingly  little  response  from  its  rivals,  who  still  seem  to  be 
pursuing  a  product  range  upclassing  strategy.  Yet  Jullien  and  Pardi  (2011)  have  uncovered  real 
problems  with  consumer  purchasing  power,  with  households’  propensity  in  recent  decades  to 
purchase new vehicles atrophying for three interrelated reasons. Firstly, in Europe households’ real 
income (excluding the top band) has risen very slowly if at all; secondly, spending on other budgetary 
items is rising rapidly (either under constraint as is the case with housing or healthcare - and even 
                                                      
7 For comparison purposes, note that the first model sold here (the Golf) accounts for 4.8% of the market. The two new Dacia models are 
predicted to achieve a market share of 1.4%, - the same ranking as the Toyota Yaris, Europe’s 15
th most widely sold vehicle. Three uncertainties looming over the European auto industry 
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education in the more neo-liberal countries - or by choice, where travel or telecoms are concerned); 
thirdly and as a direct result of the trickle-down effect, new car prices (calculated in average monthly 
salary) have tended upwards due to rising equipment levels.  
Figure 3 – Comparative commercial positioning of French and German carmakers 
 
Note: The graph depicts the commercial domination in Europe of German vs. French carmakers. It is calculated 
in terms of the total sales in Europe by the four German brands, compared with the total sales in Europe by the 
three French brands. An index value above 1 indicates that the German carmakers are dominating the market 
segment. Conversely, a value below 1 shows the French carmakers dominating the segment in question. 
Source: Jullien, Lung, 2011 (preliminary draft) 
Using the GERPISA analytical matrix that R. Boyer and M. Freyssenet published in 2002, this 
means that macro-economic conditions have been evolving, thus that carmakers should modify their 
productive model to remain profitable. Paradoxically, with the exception of Renault’s Entry strategy, 
carmakers seem to be persisting with their own representations of the marketplace - a behaviour 
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2. Towards a recomposition of the industrial architecture? 
The notion of industrial architecture within a value chain refers to the structural composition 
of the network of companies intervening therein and the way in which they interconnect. Since the 
late  1980s,  the  automobile  industrial  architecture  was  transformed  deeply  in  the  wake  of 
manufacturers’  very  broad  vertical  disintegration  movement.  Since  then  and  depending  on  the 
carmaker or model in question, we estimate that between 70 and 80% of vehicles’ return costs have 
involved equipment suppliers, suppliers and subcontractors. This quantitative increase in outsourcing 
is also a qualitative factor since it has been expanded to include design functions, and because a 
number of strategic components have been delegated to suppliers. This twofold movement has 
culminated in the shift from an industrial architecture called “flat hierarchy” (which has been around 
since World War II) to a pyramid-shaped architecture from the late 1980s onwards (Frigant, 2011.a). 
Although the initial goal was to “imitate” Japanese carmakers (Shimokawa, 1994; Fujimoto, 1999), 
developments in modularity since the late 1990s have exacerbated this tendency by paving the way 
for mega-suppliers. 
In the pyramidal vision of value chains that is so widespread today, the first tier is occupied by 
mega-suppliers whose function is to develop, produce and deliver complex raw tools to carmakers 
acting as a veritable supply chain system integrators (in the sense given to this term by Principe, 
Davies, Hobday, 2003). The second tier features smaller suppliers working on behalf of first tier 
suppliers and sometimes responsible for delivering elements directly to manufacturers. Lastly, the 
third  tier  of  this  supply  pyramid  will  involve  SMEs  supplying  second-tier  companies,  mainly  via 
subcontracting arrangements. 
This is clearly a simplified description (Frigant, 2011.a; Herrigel, 2004) since many: 
·  Suppliers intervene at several levels in the hierarchy; 
·  Companies (notably large materials suppliers and engineering firms) intervene throughout a 
pyramid and sometimes within one and the same supply chain; 
·  SMEs  still  have  direct  access  to  manufacturers  who  still  buy  simple  components  (since 
automobiles do not involve the assembly of modular bricks) and also because some models 
must be specified to adapt to local markets.  
As such, rather than the image of a very narrow pyramid with a peak comprised of mega-
suppliers  alone,  it  seems  preferable  to  describe  industrial  architecture  of  this  value  chain  as  a 
truncated pyramid that suppliers can go all the way up and down depending on the project (hence 
the use of stairs as an appropriate image). In short, these are supply chains that resemble Aztec 
rather than Egyptian pyramids. In addition, large suppliers (of materials or semi-finished products) 
and engineering firms can intervene at several levels within one and the same value chain (cf. Figure 
4).  Three uncertainties looming over the European auto industry 
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Figure 4 – The automotive industrial architecture: an Aztec pyramid 
 
Source: Frigant, 2011.a 
The Egyptian metaphor may be less appropriate than an Aztec one but one key feature of the 
past decade is nevertheless the rise of mega-suppliers. In both volume and value terms, companies 
of  this  kind  account  for  a  large  proportion  of  carmaker  procurement.  Over  1999-2010,  the 
cumulative sales of the world’s hundred leading suppliers
8 increased by 76.2% from USD 330.648 
million to USD 582.464 million (with the 2008 peak of USD 610.321 million still not having been 
recovered  two  years  later  after  a  21.8%  fall  between  2008  and  2009).  This  sharp  rise  in  sales 
unsurprisingly  led  to  strong  growth  in  the  size  of  the  companies  involved,  with  median  values 
reaching USD 3.581 million (versus 2.044 in 1999, or up 75.2%). The top 17 suppliers all had original 
sales to carmakers exceeding USD 10 billion. We should add to this the turnover from spare parts 
and, for some actors (e.g. Bosch) sales from other, non-automobile-related activities. All in all, there 
is little doubt that outsourcing has paved the way for the rise of mega-suppliers (Frigant, 2009; Klier, 
Rubenstein, 2008; Nolan, Zhang, Liu, 2008). 
                                                      
8 We are using the annual Automotive News rankings where suppliers are classified according to their direct OEM sales to automakers. Three uncertainties looming over the European auto industry 
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Source: Author, from Automotive News data 
The end result is that the market for certain modules appeared to be under the overall control 
of a handful of oligopolies. Sutherland (2005, p.243) has devised a table representing market share 
for some of the world’s leading mega-suppliers. Bosch and Delphi account, respectively, for 52% and 
21% of diesel fuel injection pumps sales; ITT and Bosch for 25% and 31% of ABS brake system sales; 
GKN for 40% of constant velocity joint sales, etc. Similarly, figures provided by Nolan, Zhang and Liu 
(2008, p.38) indicate the same type of market concentration. 
These outcomes confirm the key role that mega-suppliers play but should not be taken to 
signify that this market structure is set once and for all. In reality, three recent trends suggest that 
Europe’s industrial architecture is due to evolve in the future. 
Firstly, some automakers do worry about the risks of excessive outsourcing (Frigant, 2011.b; 
Parry, Roehrich, 2010). As noted by Morris and Donnelly (2006), externalising modules means that 
carmakers lose control over the kind of knowledge involved in detailed module design. The authors 
speak of a grey-box modules to communicate the idea that nowadays carmakers possess at best an 
approximate  understanding  of  the  way  in  which  certain  highly  technological  modules  are  being 
designed and produced. Zirpoli and Becker (2010) confirm this problem by showing that massive 
outsourcing of design tasks has led to a clear loss in technological expertise. In modular theory terms, 
outsourcing design is a risky strategy as long as the overall product architecture does not move. With 
automobiles, however, the product’s deeply systemic nature infers a situation of imperfect or impure 
modularity  (Sako,  2003;  Takeishi,  Fujimoto,  2003).  Automobiles  are  comprised  of  an  integral 
architecture  (Zirpoli,  Camuffo,  2009)  and  each  new  model  requires  rethinking,  notwithstanding 
actors’ recent efforts to share platforms and undertake carry-overs. As such, the loss of expertise 
relating  to  the  functioning  of  certain  modules  may,  over  time,  diminish  carmakers’  ability  to 
introduce  real  product  innovations.  In  addition,  they  will  also  lose  expertise  in  evaluating  the 
technological and economic suitability of whatever proposals they receive from module suppliers.  
For these two reasons, it is possible that carmakers will be looking in the future to review 
certain outsourcing strategies. This can be interpreted as an advance indicator of several recent 
decisions made in regards to electric vehicles. For instance, recently Renault announced that it would 
like  to  have  its own  electric  battery  production  capacities.  This  decision may  surprise  given the 
ostensible distance between this activity and the carmaker’s core business (and because a number of 
actors with a background in this business are already active in the market). Yet Renault’s decision can 
be interpreted using the aforementioned reasoning. On one hand, mastery of battery technology will 
be crucial in the design of future vehicles, explaining the need for vertical integration to ensure 
quality interactions between users and producers (Lundvall, 1988). On the other hand, current actors Three uncertainties looming over the European auto industry 
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in this market are powerful global firms, some of whom do not have to rely on the automotive 
industry. For them, vertical integration means freedom from the risk of oligopoly situations. 
Recently, A. Enrietti and P. Patrucco (2011) emphasize the problems involved in integrating the 
knowledge  associated  with  electric  vehicles’  development.  Their  analysis  highlights  the  radical 
aspects  of  this  product’s  development,  which  has  also  involved  designing  new  architecture; 
combining registers of competencies (some of which can be quite new); and working with actors who 
may also be new. Such actors might also be very foreign to the traditional automotive world. All in 
all, the study discovers good cause for inventing an organisational model capable of reviving some of 
vertical integration’s key properties. Of course, there is always the possibility that vertical integration 
is itself the right solution. 
Secondly and carrying on from the preceding point, industrial architecture will only stabilise 
once product architecture is itself stable. Mega-suppliers can only consolidate their positions if they 
can rely on predictable markets. By definition, however, automotive products are destined to change 
over time. Injecting new technologies, notably to reflect the popularity of leisure and entertainment 
equipment or safety and environmental regulation-driven changes, implies that cars’ architecture will 
necessarily evolve. This is one of the differences with IT (traditionally described as an example of 
pure modularity), where technological innovations occur within a modular architecture that tends to 
be set in time, with innovations that are largely incremental in nature. Modular architecture in the 
automobile sector can, on the other hand, evolve significantly. At present, injecting new technologies 
means  integrating  with  what  already  exists.  Over  the  long  run,  however,  this  is  not  tenable.  A 
threshold effect will necessarily arise, with components delivered directly by suppliers operating at 
the Tier 1 level ultimately being declassified and becoming components of other components. A 
simple  example  is  car  lights,  components  that  carmakers  have  traditionally  purchased  directly. 
Nowadays they are often integrated directly into vehicles’ rear or front modules, meaning that car 
light suppliers have fallen from Tier 1 to Tier 2. Some actors anticipated this change and have started 
working as front/rear module integrators - but not everyone. The example may be anecdotal but it 
translates the endogenous dynamics underlying OEM equipment. 
This is an unstable market and the actors operating in it must adapt to change. Also, suppliers 
will  often  behave  proactively  and  offer  carmakers new  modular  solutions.  Any  model  based  on 
technological  competition  between  suppliers  will  inherently  apply  its  own  renewal  -  especially 
nowadays, at a time when technologies with roots in other industrial sectors are likely to spread. It 
will be harder to control newcomers in the future, notably because the emergence of new vehicle 
types (ultra-low-cost vehicles) and new driving systems (electric, hybrid) will attract new actors at 
both the manufacturer and supplier levels – especially since electric vehicles do not entail the same 
components  as  internal  combustion  vehicles.  In  addition  to  the  problems  faced  in  electrifying 
drivetrains, in time the whole product architecture is destined to change, creating both opportunities 
and risks for suppliers (as per the scenario envisaged by the CEO of Valeo, a first tier supplier, c.f. 
Aschenbroich, 2010). Replacing internal combustion with electric vehicles should therefore lead to a 
significant shift in the demand that carmakers are sending upstream within their branch
9. 
This point introduces a third kind of uncertainty weighing upon the industrial architectures in 
this sector. Despite the advance of globalisation, mega-suppliers have historically grown by following 
in their domestic carmakers’ footsteps. Table 2 illustrates this correlation. The decline of American 
suppliers and rise of their South Korean, Japanese and German counterparts seems closely correlated 
                                                      
9  As  explained  by  Hans-Jörg  Bullinger  (President  of  the  Fraunhofer  Society):  “Everyone  participating  in  electric  car  assembly  chain 
operations must adapt to this change. Subcontractors, for instance, will no longer make certain components that will be replaced by 
others” (quoted in Usine Nouvelle, n°3184, p.75). Three uncertainties looming over the European auto industry 
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with the respective fates of their fellow national carmakers
10. One explanation is that several global 
carmakers  have  maintained  powerful  supplier  branches,  with  examples  including  Toyota,  PSA, 
Hyundai  or  Fiat.  This  is  because  productive  outsourcing  does  not  necessarily  signify  the  end  of 
ownership links (Frigant, 2009). Still, this is not the only explanatory factor, as demonstrated by the 
German example where national mega-suppliers are independent from carmakers and the growing 
power  of  German  suppliers  concretely  illustrates  our  hypothesis  that  within  a  given  national 
network, carmakers and suppliers are symbiotically connected. 
Table 2 – Nationality of world’s top 100 auto suppliers 
    1999  2005  2010 
Total NAFTA  49  31  32 
USA   44  28  28 
Canada   4  2  3 
NAFTA 
Mexico  1  1  1 
Total Asia  16  28  33 
South Korea  0  2  4  Asia 
Japan  16  26  29 
Total Europe  35  41  35 
Spain  0  1  2 
UK   6  4  3 
Italy  1  2  2 
Sweden   1  3  3 
France   8  7  4 
Germany   17  21  18 
Europe 
Other Europe   2  3  3 
Source: Author, from Automotive News data 
If this hypothesis turns out to be robust, it will raise questions about the potential rise of 
suppliers originating from emerging countries. Indeed, Chinese and Indian carmakers are developing 
rapidly and it is worth ascertaining whether they will bring many of their local suppliers with them. 
Certainly,  the  Brazilian  example  seems  to  disprove  this  scenario.  Expanding  local  production 
capacities  in  this  latter  country  has  not  helped  local  suppliers’  emergence but,  to  the  contrary, 
caused them to atrophy. At the same time, the supply industry operating inside of Brazil is under the 
domination  of  large  global  suppliers  that  acquired  local  suppliers  and/or  developed  their  own 
greenfield capacities (Humphrey, Salerno, 2000). Moreover, this argument could be reversed since it 
appears to confirm that carmakers brought their local suppliers with them due to the fact that Brazil 
does not have its own domestic manufacturers. The rise in local assembly operations reflects the 
actions of Western carmakers who have brought their traditional suppliers with them
11.  
The examples of China and India could lead to a different scenario. Clearly, Chinese carmakers 
are relatively eager at present to rely on Western mega-suppliers with local operations who can 
provide them with the organisational technological know-how that will help them to improve their 
product offer. Yet several researchers have highlighted the emergence of local firms who are rapidly 
developing similar competencies. We are already familiar with several examples of Chinese suppliers 
starting to move out of their domestic market
12. If history were to repeat itself, there is little doubt 
that they will be a force to reckon with in the future. In turn, this evokes the third uncertainty 
affecting both carmakers and suppliers, to wit, the future role of the emerging countries.  
                                                      
10 For an analysis of the US carmakers trajectories, see Freyssenet, Jetin, 2011. 
11 The same analysis can be applied to Eastern Europe (Pavlinek, 2008, regarding the Czech Republic) 
12 For instance, the glass-maker Fuyao has just announced that $200 million investment in Russia, with other company projects also in the 
pipeline (AutoPress, 13/07/2011). Three uncertainties looming over the European auto industry 
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3. Uncertain geography of the European automotive industry: 
Between the rise of emerging countries and the move eastwards 
The automobile is an expensive product with high transportation costs that limit any long-
distance logistics to niche models, especially given the custom barriers that continue (to varying 
degrees) to separate different countries/economic zones. In reality, the dominant (but clearly not 
exclusive
13)  model  underlying  the  organisation  of  automotive  production  revolves  around  the 
existence of integrated regional blocks (Freyssenet, Lung, 2000). 
Having  said  that,  domestic  market  dynamics  are  important  parameters  insofar  as  they 
determine  carmakers’  strategic  priorities  in  terms  of  plant  localisation  and  other  investment 
decisions. Two contemporary dynamics merit further exploration within this analysis.  
3.1. The global automotive business’s displacement towards Asia and China 
For a long time, the Triad zone, comprised of Japan, Western Europe and North America, 
served as the automotive world’s centre of gravity. This has changed now, with Asia experiencing 
extraordinarily fast development as both a production location and a consumption zone. Today the 
Triad is less and less meaningful in the automotive world.  
In 2009, China became the industry’s leading market with 13.671 million new cars sold (10.593 
million passenger cars and 3.078 million commercial vehicles). 4.5 million extra units were sold here 
between 2008 and 2009, at a time when global sales fell by 2.827 million. A little more than one in 
every five passenger cars sold in the world is sold in China. Asides from any symbolic value, China’s 
top ranking
14 attests to a rapid shift in the global market. The core automotive market  has moved to 
Asia’s fast-growing emerging countries, where there is great hunger for new motoring solutions.
15 
Conversely, the European, North American and Japanese markets, saturated and suffering from the 
economic crisis, are finding it hard to maintain levels of demand.  
The rise of the Chinese market has led to a similarly rapid wave of investments by foreign and 
domestic carmakers, resulting in a spectacular growth in national output. Between 2000 and 2010, 
production in China rose by a factor of 8.8, going from 2,069,069 units to 18,264,667 according to 
OICA data. India experienced the second fastest growth rate, with production multiply by a factor of 
4.4  to  reach 3,536,783  units  by  the  year 2010.  Similar  growth can  be witnessed  in other  Asian 
countries (Thailand, x3.9; Indonesia x2.4; Malaysia, x2.0), the end result being that Asia (excluding 
Japan) now accounts for 40% of global production. China was responsible for 23.5% of all vehicles 
assembled in the world in 2010, with the other Asian countries (ex-Japan) accounting for 16.5%; 
Western Europe 17,6%; North America 15.6%; Japan 12.4%; the rest of Europe (central Europe and 
ex-Soviet republics) 7.7%; and South America 5.6%. In sum, as Figure 6 clearly shows, there has been 
a rapid and massive displacement in the global automotive industry’s centre of gravity.  
                                                      
13 Examples include the New Beatle being produced in Mexico, the Audi TT in Hungary, etc. 
14 Further confirmed in 2010 with a figure of 18.06 million vehicles, including 13.8 million passenger cars sold in China that year, according 
to the Chinese Automakers Association. 
15 Motorisation rates in China were at 8‰ in 1995, 12‰ in 2000 and 38‰ in 2009. To compare, in 2009 the same rates were 586‰ in the 
European Union, 598‰ in France, 591‰ in Japan, 819‰ in the United States, 141‰ in Brazil and 16‰ in India Three uncertainties looming over the European auto industry 
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Figure 6 - Production of cars and commercial vehicles 
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Source: Author, using OICA data 
This shift asks two questions of European carmakers (and leading suppliers). The first involves 
how  they  might  incorporate  China  into  their  strategies.  The  second  relates  to  the  role  of  local 
carmakers.  
The first question refers to the role that Asian countries are meant to assume in European 
carmakers’  development  strategies.  Some,  such  as  Germany’s  Volkswagen,  BMW  or  Daimler  or 
France’s PSA see this is a strategic development access. These are manufacturers who view Asia as a 
growth driver that is cruelly lacking in Europe, where sales have stagnated. In a sense, this does not 
increase the European industry’s fragility, since its companies are strengthened by this new catalyst. 
It certainly has little bearing on the production plants operating in Europe at present – because of 
transportation costs and with the exception of luxury models that can be exported from anywhere 
within Europe, most carmakers nowadays are already producing on-site in the markets where they 
make their sales. In addition, research and development capacities have already expanded in the 
new spaces, most notably in China. Indeed, an “old” vision of the international division of labour 
might have intimated that development capacities should still be embedded in the global trading 
system’s so-called central countries, close to multinational companies’ world headquarters. Yet the 
current phase of globalisation tends more towards a macro-regional kind of integration that induces 
carmakers to situate their development capacities locally because they need to adapt products to 
local markets (and often even have to design specific products for such spaces). Examples include the 
Renault Sandero, which was specifically developed for the Brazilian market even before the decision 
was  taken  to  sell  it  in  other  countries.  The  long-term  ascendancy  of  today’s  emerging  markets 
suggests that behaviours of this kind might spread in the future. Furthermore, China and India’s 
training systems are creating an abundant workforce of new engineers, intimating that these markets 
are under-sized and will expand in the future. A veritable integrated local industry seems to be taking 
shape  under  our  eyes,  raising  questions  as  to  whether,  in  the  image  of  American  carmakers’ 
European subsidiaries, European carmakers’ Chinese or Indian subsidiaries might in time become 
largely autonomous. In a similar vein, they could be given responsibility for developing some of the 
market segments of the future. Western carmakers’ recent alliances with their Indian counterparts to 
build ultra-low-cost vehicles seem to be sending signals in this direction. 
Another question relates to the way in which carmakers will manage their internal resource 
allocations. In a context where financial resources are increasingly rare, the fear is that over the long 
run,  China,  India  and  South  America  will  be  considered  the  priority  and  domestic  investments Three uncertainties looming over the European auto industry 
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secondary - especially given the surplus production capacities found in the Triad. The semi-absence 
of assembly site closures in Europe during the 2008/2009 crisis (contrasting sharply with the North 
American situation, c.f. Klier, Rubenstein, 2011) suggests that some rather painful closure decisions 
may have been postponed. 
The second uncertainty relates to the future for new Chinese and/or Indian carmakers. Three 
aspects should be considered here. Firstly, the frequent obligation to enter China via joint ventures 
allows local carmakers to build up competencies through contacts with their Western counterparts. 
Clearly, some  of the  latter  will  follow  PSA’s  example  and  take  care  to  separate  production  and 
development activities so as to limit any knowledge transfers, but alongside of this there have been 
rapid improvements in Chinese companies and universities’ research capabilities. In addition both 
symbolising the shift in the global automobile’s centre of gravity and serving as a springboard for 
companies taking positions in mature markets, Asian carmakers have started to take over foreign 
manufacturers, brands and technologies, with Indian companies such as Tata Motors and Mahindra 
& Mahindra having respectively acquired Jaguar-Land Rover and SsangYong Motor Company, and 
Chinese companies SAIC and Geely taking control of Rover and Volvo. Secondly, Chinese carmakers 
(notably the independents) rely strongly on Western and Japanese supply subsidiaries with local 
operations. A real technological and organisational transfer takes place through their contacts with 
these companies. Lastly, the third aspect is that the Chinese government has started to focus on 
electric cars, with some local companies such as BYD working very actively to develop this type of 
vehicle (see above).  
G. Balcet and J. Ruet (2011) analyse Indian and Chinese carmakers’ different strategies in 
greater depth. More specifically, the authors outline the wide array of trajectories that these actors 
follow by making a double distinction between Indian and Chinese manufacturers, one hand, and 
different carmakers within each country, on the other. Embedding them in a framework defined by 
multinational  enterprise  theory,  the  study  explains  the  role of  public  policy,  forms of  corporate 
governance,  catching-up  issues  and  carmakers’  international  growth  patterns.  It  confirms  these 
companies’  promising  dynamics,  especially  given  their  apparent  development  of  a  new  kind  of 
international division of labour, one where India specialises in ultra-low-cost cars while China focuses 
on electric vehicles. In both cases, there is every chance that future technology transfers between 
Western carmakers and their Indian and Chinese counterparts could become much more balanced. 
The  diversity  of  trajectories  suggests  that  the  Asian  carmakers’  catching-up  process  has  already 
begun and that they will become credible rivals in the not-too-distant future.  
3.2. The eastwards move of European production 
The European market grew slowly during the 1990s to peak in 2007. 2008 and 2009 saw a 
sharp  decline  of  18.5%,  equivalent  to  the  loss  of  4.258  million  units.  In  line  with  a  regionally 
integrated production logic, lower sales dragged production down, with a fall of 5.843 million units 
(or 25.6%) being recorded over these two years. Above and beyond any business cycle effects, it is 
clear that the productive geography transformed profoundly over the past decade. 
Between 2000 and 2010, European output fell by 7.2% to reach 18,020,208 vehicles assembled 
(cars and commercial vehicles combined), according to OICA data. What is most noteworthy here, 
however, is this production’s geographic displacement, with Eastern Europe (plus Turkey) increasing 
by a factor of 2.2 fold over this period and Western Europe down by 7.2%. The eight countries 
constituting the Eastern European bloc accounted for 9.9% of European output in 2000; 14.5% in 
2005; and 24.0% in 2010 (see Figure 7).  Three uncertainties looming over the European auto industry 
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Source: Author, using OICA & CCFA data 
It  remains  that  this  general  decline  featured  strong  national  disparities  between  Western 
Europe’s main manufacturing countries (cf. Figure 8).  
·  One category is comprised of Britain and Italy, where output has fallen markedly since the early 
2000s. These countries’ automotive industries are clearly embarked on a lasting downwards 
spiral.  
·  Spain and France resemble one another in the sense that they both experienced an initial 
phase  characterised  by  extra  output  followed  by  a  sharp  fall  in  2008  and  2009  before  a 
recovery in 2010 that meant a return to mid-1990s levels.  
·  Germany is an exception in this overview, having strengthened its position over the whole of 
the period. Although the crisis also affected this country, the effects seemed less severe here 
and above all, production volumes remained above what they had been in 1996. German 
output also recovered strongly in 2010, even matching its 2007 peak.  Three uncertainties looming over the European auto industry 
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In relative terms, Germany accounted for 31.6% of total Western European output in 2000 but 
43.1% in 2010. Including Eastern Europe and Turkey in the calculation, 28.5% of vehicles produced in 
Europe were made in Germany in 2000, versus 32.8% in 2010.  
Excluding  Germany,  falling  output  in  other  Western  countries  can  be  explained  less  by  a 
straightforward  decline  in  domestic  carmakers’  fortunes  and  more  by  the  relocalisation  of  their 
productive apparatus. One example is the French carmaking industry. 
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Source: Author, using CCFA data 
Over 1997-2010, PSA and Renault’s amalgamated output rose by a factor of 1.56 but as Figure 
9 shows, the geography of their productive apparatus had also changed. In 2010, 69.8% of French 
carmakers’ production took place overseas, versus only 37.6% in 1997. This is somewhat logical since 
to  survive  in  an  ever-changing  world,  French  carmakers  have  had  to  develop  new  production 
capabilities in growth markets such as China and South America. It remains that volumes produced in 
France by French carmakers have fallen constantly since 2004 (if we exclude the 2010 recovery), 
even  as  these  companies  were  increasing  their  overseas  production.  Asides  from  the  desire  to 
conquer  new  markets,  the  crossing  of  these  two  production  curves  can  also  be  explained  by 
decisions to build new production sites and/or extend existing plants in low-cost countries located on 
the periphery of Europe’s industrial heartlands. For Renault, this meant the acquisition of Dacia in 
Romania in 1999; a greater role for Bursa (Turkey) and Novo Mesto (Slovenia); a partnership and 
subsequent  acquisition  in  2011  of  Avtovaz  in  Russia,  combined  with  an  announced  doubling  of 
production here by the year 2016; and lastly, the opening soon of a new site in Tangiers. For PSA, this 
meant Trnava in Slovakia (opened in 2006 with 3,000 employees by 2010) and Kolin (joint-venture 
with Toyota, opened in 2005 and with 3,400 employees now).  
Eastern European production sites have two functions. They can be supplementary locations 
producing models assembled in other group plants – in which case, the goal is to increase production 
capacity to satisfy demand. At the same time, they can exert positive pressure on the productivity of 
older European sites, especially since they generally constitute new plants with high productivity 
levels. Alongside of this, there is the appearance of sites dedicated to certain models or model 
versions.  Examples  include  Renault’s  Entry  range  vehicles,  which  are  exclusively  assembled  in 
Romania (and soon in Tangiers, if we accept Morocco as part of an expanded European space)
16. 
Peugeot-Citroën’s market entry models are assembled at Trnava in the Czech Republic whereas the 
Renault Twingo is assembled at Novo Mesto in Slovenia. Lastly, specific passenger car or commercial 
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vehicle  model  varieties  might  also  be  assembled  in  these  zones  alone.  In  other  words,  French 
carmakers seem to be pursuing two strategies simultaneously: a search for the low-cost production 
of models characterised by their inexpensive sales price; and the duplication of the sites involved in 
Europe’s best-selling models (Megane, 207/C3, Clio). 
Table 3 – Models assembled in 2009 by French carmakers in Eastern Europe and Turkey  
Brand  Model  Country  Produced in Western Europe 





Slovakia  Yes (France, Spain) 




Turkey  Yes (Spain, Portugal) 
Renault  Twingo  Slovenia  No 
Turkey 
Renault  Clio 
Slovenia 




Romania  No 
Renault  Megane  Turkey  Yes (France, Spain) 
Renault  Fluence  Turkey  No  
Source: CCFA, 2010 
T. Klier and J. Rubinstein (2011) propose another way of measuring the European automotive 
industry’s relocalisation, one that uses an original database to survey automakers and leading global 
mega-suppliers’ plants. This study has detected a significant shift in European geography, whose 
centre of gravity has moved markedly eastwards. This can also be found in the United States over the 
same period of time but there is a European specificity to this phenomenon, namely the fact that the 
trend has been accompanied by few plant closures. The authors’ analysis extends into a study of the 
locations where the world’s main suppliers operate – with once again, a move eastwards being 
apparent here as well. 
This  finding  corroborates  recent  and  original  “post-crisis”  data  from  previous  analyses 
describing the relocalisation of the European automotive industry (Sadler, 1999; Domanski, Lung, 
2009; Pavlinek, Domanski, Gwodsz, 2009). Over the medium term, however, two uncertainties reign 
at this level. 
The first involves carmakers. In a context of weak markets and surplus capacities, questions 
need to be asked about the future of sites in Old Europe. It is worth remembering harsh statements 
by Fiat CEO Marchionne concerning Italian sites’ lack of competitiveness. More recently in France, 
there have been rumours that Peugeot might close its Aulnay site. In both cases, the group executive 
has emphasized production costs deemed excessive within an integrated European framework that 
offers low-cost production locations. Yet Toyota has also just invested €125 million in French plants 
manufacturing its Yaris, supporting the idea that these remain profitable production sites. Moreover, 
new vehicles (both electric and hybrid) are usually portrayed as having to be assembled within this 
very  same  Old Europe.  Such  decisions  seem  relatively  rational  inasmuch as  the  development of 
organisational  and  technological  competencies  –  plus  their  capitalisation  -  necessitate  close 
proximity between design and production functions. In addition (and at a political level), it is easier to 
get European states’ support in driving new products’ emergence when the company can claim that 
it is creating local jobs.  
The second uncertainty pertains to automotive suppliers. Research by Klier and Rubinstein 
(2011) has quantified the aforementioned eastwards relocalisation using a broad database. On a 
more qualitative level, Frigant and Layan (2009) have argued that this shift is part of an international Three uncertainties looming over the European auto industry 
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division of productive processes being implemented by large multinational firms. The idea here is 
that modularisation enables the fragmentation of production by breaking down the three types of 
production  for  which  mega-suppliers  are  responsible:  macro-components  (modules);  meso-
components; and components. Within a European framework, they argue that component plants 
tend  to  delocalise  towards  low-cost  countries  whereas  module-assembling  semi-plants  are 
duplicated in both the East and the West. They also note that once a certain threshold of carmaker 
customers is exceeded in a low-cost country, it also becomes possible to locate a meso-component 
plant there. At that point, the uncertainty weighing upon the European industry relates to carmakers’ 
ongoing  relocalisation  trend  –  which  is  being  followed,  if  this  hypothesis  is  correct,  by  the 
amplification of similar moves by suppliers. 
 
Conclusion 
The present article has asked questions about the future of the European automotive industry, 
albeit from different perspectives and covering different themes. Hopefully these few lines will have 
demonstrated that behind any apparent heterogeneity, three major uncertainties still weigh upon 
European carmakers and suppliers.  
The first relates to market access. European carmakers are facing a twofold challenge: knowing 
what kind of car they want to be designing and producing for the future, in a context where internal 
combustion vehicles are being seriously questioned; and knowing how to persuade consumers to 
renew  their  stock  of  vehicles  and  purchase  new  units  in  a  situation  characterised  by  falling 
purchasing power and less spending on new vehicle purchases. 
The second uncertainty relates to the degree of vertical integration and more generally to the 
kind of industrial architecture that is likely to prevail in the future. Whereas recent decades were 
characterised by straightforward outsourcing, it is not at all certain that this trend will continue. 
Competency integration problems remain and could even worsen if the automotive world were to 
adopt new driving modes. Other problems relating to the balance of power within this branch have 
also worsened as mega-suppliers become stronger. Lastly, new actors originating from emerging 
countries and/or new sectors are also likely to arise in the not-too-distant future. 
The third uncertainty then relates to these new automotive production countries. A distinction 
should be made at this level between emerging countries that seem attractive investment locations 
but where there is a risk that European carmakers’ strategic priorities may be diluted. In addition, 
new actors coming out of India and China will undoubtedly become stronger over time, especially 
since - in the case of China – the State in this part of the world often plays a very active role in terms 
of industrial policy. Then, on a European scale, the fact that the industry’s centre of gravity is shifting 
towards  Eastern  Europe  raises  questions  about  preserving  jobs  (for  carmakers  and  especially 
suppliers) in the Old Europe. 
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